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COLLUSIVE BIDDING
By

RALPH S.

LOCHER

Mr. Ralph S. Locher has been Director of Law of Cleveland, Ohio,
since 1953. He received the A.B.
degree from Bluffton College in
1936, and the LL.B. degree from
Western Reserve University Law
School in 1939. In 1945, he became Secretary to the Industrial
Commission of Ohio and was appointed Executive Secretary to Governor Lausche in 1946.

Collusive bidding practices are a real and ever-present problem
facing local, state and federal governments. On the federal or state
levels, the governmental units have at their disposal a large body of
comparative figures that focuses attention on instances when collusion among the bidders is likely to be present. Local governmental
subdivisions usually lack the necessary investigative staff to make
them aware of collusion among bidders.
Collusion may take many forms. Recently the federal government returned indictments against five electrical companies which
disclosed "rigged" bidding, principally among suppliers to municipalities. The indictments alleged that they conspired to share local
government business on a fixed percentage basis, and that they connived and bid at certain fixed amounts so that predetermined percentages would be realized. To achieve this result, one group of
conspirators met thirty-five times. To effect the scheme, or formula,
for quoting nearly identical prices to electric utility companies and
others, a cyclic, rotating, positioning formula was employed whereby one defendant manufacturer would quote the low price, other
defendant companies would quote intermediate prices, and others
would quote high prices. These positions would be periodically
rotated among the manufacturers. With reference to these matters,
purchases in the city of Cleveland within the past twelve months
total $94,961.00. Assuming that other municipalities, counties,
townships, school boards, and the state governments have been
similarly duped, the magnitude of the problem becomes self-evident.
It is apparent that such rotation would preclude a local government's awareness of the collusion inasmuch as the entire country
figures in the rotation and because all of the bids would vary somewhat under the formula submitted. Not all collusive bidders, however, can take such precautions against discovery.
Probably the most apparent cases of collusive bidding are those
in which all bids received are identical except for one, which is
slightly lower. This immediately throws up a red flag for the alert
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purchasing agent, director of a department, or anyone who is directly responsible for the purchasing of the specific items being bid
upon. Identical bidding, however, is not proof, in and of itself, that
there has been collusion in entering bids.
If the product is such that there is a leader in the field, and
others follow the leader without collusion, identical bids mean little
as proof of collusion. If there is but one supplier, and all bidders use
cost plus a commonly recognized percentage of profit, there certainly is no collusion. The problem, of course, is the ability to recognize
collusive bids as they appear.
In the city of Cleveland, a superficial survey disclosed that in
the period of one year, purchases amounting to over one-half million dollars were made in cases where all bidders submitted identical bids. This figure does not include bids which are identical but
for the one low bid.
One of the practices that gives impetus to identical bids is
rotating the award of contracts, i. e., when all bids are identical
the award is made to one other than the last successful bidder for
that particular product. Of course in this situation, the bidders know
that if they submit identical bids, a certain rotation will be followed.
If they are satisfied with an award on that particular product when
this "turn" comes up, the governmental unit has unwittingly assisted
the operation of collusion, though it was attempting to do only what
was fair under the circumstances. A possible solution is for the
award to be made to the last successful bidder if all bids are identical.
Generally, in order to prevent the evil of collusion between officials and suppliers, governments require sealed bids and further
require that the award be given to the lowest and best, or, the
lowest responsible bidder. These requirements have made collusive
bidding to governmental subdivisions feasible and attractive to the
bidders. Admittedly, the bid requirements cannot be removed or
even greater evils will result. However, when the bidders know
that the lowest bid, generally speaking, will get the award, even
though at a figure higher than is justified by the market, collusion
is a tempting means for making a sure profit.
How can such practices be prevented short of court proceedings
after lengthy investigations that probably could not produce enough
evidence if conducted by local independent governmental units?
If case law or statute permit, rejection of all bids is one possibility. Rejection however, can work an even greater pecuniary loss
to the governmental subdivision than collusion. If the product is
needed immediately, as is often the case, rejection of all bids may
introduce a costly and time consuming delay. Query: (1) Should
the law provide that where bids are identical, public auction may
be made upon the opening of bids, the lowest then receiving the
award? (2) Should the award be made one, two, or three weeks
later, thus permitting others to bid below the identical bids? (3)
Should a coin be tossed to select the successful bidder?
Some formula to discourage identical bids is certainly needed.
The purpose of sealed bids, and awards being made to the lowest
and best, is to achieve true competitive bidding. The law in this
field, as in all other fields, must change with the changing times.
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Rather than penal statutes, the need seems to be for law which will
forestall the occurence.
In the early part of this year, the city of Cleveland asked for
bids on items having two sources of supply. Four bidders submitted
identical bids of $60,120.00. Each of the bidders was then asked to
have a representative appear at a meeting with the Director of Law
where they were asked, quite frankly, "How could four bidders return identical bids on a contract of this size?" The reply was that
each, without collusion with the others, added a certain percentage
to the cost from the manufacturer and thus identical bids resulted.
All bids were rejected. Upon readvertising, the same companies bid
again. The bids were no longer identical and, on these bids, the city
did realize a saving. If the Department of Law had not taken the
initiative, this saving would never have been realized nor would
this irksome practice, at least in this instance, have been stopped.
Fortunately, in this case the material was not urgently needed.
The boldness of some bidders can be seen by the following
examples of bids received by the city of Cleveland, within one year:
Load Break Oil Switches - 4 bids
(identical)
$ 4,869.00
Rock Sale - 2 bids
(identical)
248,000.00
Fuse Cutouts (1000) - 5 bids
(identical)
13,500.00
Lightning Arresters - 5 bids
(4)
$976.20;
(1)
976.80
Anhydrous Ferric Chloride (800 T.) 2 bids
(identical)
64,000.00
Sodium Silico Fluoride (250 T.) - 7 bids
Minimum Delivery 25 T.
(identical)
34,350.00
Minimum Delivery 18 T.
(identical)
34,700.00
Cable, 10,000 Ft. - 5 bids
(identical)
13,320.00
Cable
- 5 bids;
(4)
$9,455.00;
(1)
9,395.00
Cable
- 5 bids
(identical)
13,970.00
Cable
- 5 bids;
(4)
$8,462.00;
(1)
8,742.00
Cable
- 5 bids
(identical)
67,520.00
One request or bids covering twenty items of fiber conduit was
conditioned upon the bid being broken down per item after which
there was response from four bidders. Items ran from $10.50 for 50
fiber caps to $11,000.00 for conduit. Three of the bidders were identical to the penny on each and every item. The fourth bidder was low
on each and every item by 1/2 of 1%.
It is inconceivable that such a large total of unvarying bids on
such varied articles of merchandise would have been presented by a
number of separate bidders if the healthy interplay of competition
were present. It is reasonable to assume that when two or more
suppliers bid the same dollar figure, the municipality or other governmental body is not receiving a dollar's worth of merchandise for
each dollar spent.
Scrutiny of the pleadings and evidence in the federal cases
should be of significant advantage to local governments. In the event
that the government is successful in convicting the defendants, the
municipalities that purchase from them will then have a cause of
action in treble damages.'
The public spotlight must be placed upon organizations which
1 15 U.S.C.A., § 15.
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insist upon thwarting the spirit and the law of competitive bidding.
Most states have some form of legislation prohibiting collusive bidding or statutes prohibiting agreements in restraint of trade, but
proof of an agreement in restraint of trade is difficult to obtain. The
problem should be tackled by making it unprofitable or unfeasible
on a local level to enter into such agreements.
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Reliable service is
no accident ...

this man and others

like him work around the clock no matter what the weather, to be
sure that the best possible electric service is available when you
want it.
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